China’s unusual abstention from UN’s Iran vote highlights diplomatic squeeze amid Middle East conflict

BEIJING: China’s decision to abstain from a recent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) vote condemning Iran’s attacks on Gulf countries has spotlighted a familiar diplomatic playbook under growing pressure as Beijing tries to balance ties amid the widening Middle East conflict, say analysts.

The Mar 11 resolution, which condemned Tehran’s strikes and demanded an immediate halt to hostilities, passed with 13 of the Security Council’s 15 members in favour. China and Russia - both permanent UNSC members - abstained.

It marks a shift from China’s past voting pattern on Iran, having previously backed four rounds of UN sanctions over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme between 2006 and 2010.

For observers, the latest vote encapsulates China’s longstanding approach of emphasising neutrality and opposing what it sees as one-sided resolutions.

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“China’s abstention should be read primarily as continuity rather than a meaningful shift,” Guy Burton, an independent political analyst and China observer, told CNA.

At the same time, with strategic ties to Iran, expanding economic stakes in the Gulf and a broader rivalry with Western powers shaping the diplomatic backdrop, Beijing is increasingly navigating a narrowing space to stay above the fray, they noted.

“It is difficult for Beijing to take a position in this case,” Zeno Leoni, a lecturer at King’s College London, told CNA.

“China could not condemn Iran, its political partner, but the Gulf countries matter more to China in the short term.”

ABSTENTION WITH SIGNIFICANCE

Tabled by Bahrain on behalf of Gulf Cooperation Council states and Jordan, the Mar 11 resolution condemned Iran’s attacks on Gulf countries and Jordan, which is not considered a Gulf state, as a breach of international law and a threat to international peace and security.

It also demanded an immediate halt to the attacks and reaffirmed support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states targeted.

China said the resolution was “unbalanced” and did not fully reflect “the root cause and the overall picture of the conflict”. The resolution text did not mention the US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb 28 that triggered Tehran’s retaliatory attacks on its Gulf neighbours.

Beijing’s justification aligns with its longstanding preference for “more generalised, less attribution-heavy formulations”, said Burton, the independent political analyst.

“The claim that the resolution was ‘unbalanced’ is not simply rhetorical - it reflects a genuine feature of Chinese diplomatic positioning at the UN,” he said.

“However, it also serves a clear political function: it allows Beijing to avoid a public rupture with Iran.”

That pattern has been visible across other conflicts.

In Syria’s civil war, China repeatedly resisted draft resolutions that blamed the Assad government or sought punitive action. One example came in 2017, after a chemical weapons attack on the rebel-held town of Khan Shaykhun, when China voted with Russia against a draft condemning the attack and pressing Damascus to cooperate with investigators.

On Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the contrast was clear. In 2025, the third anniversary of the conflict, China backed a more general UNSC resolution that mourned the loss of life and called for a swift end to hostilities, without naming Moscow or assigning blame.

Yet China’s decision in the Mar 11 UNSC vote stands out against its record on Iran, where it had previously backed multiple rounds of UN sanctions as part of a coordinated international effort to curb Tehran’s nuclear programme.

Between 2006 and 2010, Beijing supported four sanctions resolutions on Iran, but these votes came within the framework of the P5+1. P5+1 refers to the five permanent members of the UNSC - China, France, Russia, Britain and the US - plus Germany.

Against this backdrop, analysts said China’s latest abstention was familiar in form, but more unusual in the Iran context - reflecting Beijing’s broader preference for resisting texts it sees as overly narrow in assigning blame, even as it contrasts with earlier support for UN sanctions on Tehran as part of a broader multilateral effort.

A THREE-WAY BALANCING ACT

Analysts pointed to three overlapping pressures that lie at the heart of China’s UNSC abstention on Mar 11.

They are China’s ties with Iran, its ties with Gulf states and its alignment with Russia - with which it shares a “no limits” strategic partnership - at the UN, where the two often aligned in opposition to Western-led initiatives.

“Rather than choosing between these, China is attempting to avoid alienating any of them. The abstention is a product of that balancing act, not a clear prioritisation,” said Burton.

Leoni of King’s College London voiced a similar view, while suggesting that some pressures weigh more heavily than others.

“I am sure that ties with Iran and the Gulf were more important in informing China’s decision, compared to alignment with Russia,” he said.

China’s economic interests in the Middle East, especially the Gulf, have grown substantially in recent years.

According to statistics tabulated by Asia House, a London-based think tank and advisory service, China became the Gulf’s largest trading partner in 2024, with trade reaching US$257 billion.

Energy remains a key part of that relationship. According to analysis by the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, China imported 11.6 million barrels of crude a day in 2025.

Country-level data for 2024 showed that Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait alone accounted for nearly a quarter of China’s crude imports.

At the same time, Iran is a long-term political and energy partner to China.

The two countries signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement in 2021, and Beijing backed Tehran’s membership in the BRICS+ and Shanghai Cooperation Organization international groupings.

A yes vote by China on Mar 11 would have risked a public break with Tehran, while a veto would have put Beijing in direct opposition to Gulf partners that matter far more to it economically in the short term, analysts noted.

This geopolitical balancing act has been reflected in China’s public messaging.

At his Mar 8 press conference on the sidelines of China’s annual political gatherings known as the Two Sessions, Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the “sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Iran and all countries in the Gulf region should be respected and must not be violated”, while also calling for a return to dialogue and opposing the abuse of force.

In Leoni’s view, the abstention creates an opportunity for the West to criticise China, while in the Gulf, including Iran, countries may have to conceal disappointment that Beijing did not back them more clearly.

Burton, the independent political analyst, offered a more differentiated reading.

“Tehran is unlikely to interpret the abstention as a betrayal, but nor will it see it as strong support,” he said, arguing that China-Iran ties remain pragmatic and asymmetric rather than alliance-based.

Meanwhile for Gulf nations, China’s UN vote may be less consequential than its broader pattern of regional engagement, Burton said.

“Gulf states ... will note that China did not defend Iran and has continued active diplomatic engagement with them. For these states, China’s actions - such as high-level visits and ongoing cooperation - matter more than its UN voting posture.”

China’s future voting behaviour on Iran-related issues will likely hinge on the framing of resolutions, Burton said.

“It may support resolutions that are broadly framed, avoid explicit blame, and emphasise de-escalation or general principles. It is likely to abstain from texts that single out Iran without acknowledging wider conflict dynamics.”

GLOBAL POWER AMBITIONS

At the same time, China’s abstention raises a broader question about the role it wants to play in the Middle East.

In its public messaging, Beijing has said it wants to help de-escalate the crisis. Wang has said China would “continue playing a constructive role” and Chinese diplomats have been in contact with regional parties calling for peace, an end to hostilities and a return to dialogue.

While Beijing has expanded its economic footprint in the region, it has shown less appetite for the kind of political or security role traditionally associated with great-power mediation, analysts said.

“This abstention reinforces that pattern: China prefers diplomatic positioning and selective engagement over direct involvement in conflict resolution,” said Burton.

At the same time, it does not mean China lacks ambition, with visible efforts to present Chinese-led ideas on global order and security, including the Global Security Initiative first proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2022.

In the Middle East, the clearest expression of that role came in March 2023, when China brokered a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, restoring diplomatic relations and the reopening of embassies after a seven-year rupture.

The agreement was widely viewed as a diplomatic success for Beijing and reinforced its image as a state able to talk to all sides.

But analysts said the significance of that breakthrough should not be overstated.

“The 2023 Saudi-Iran agreement generated considerable attention, but it was more symbolic than transformative,” said Burton.

“Recent conflicts since then - the Israel-Hamas war, the US-Israel attacks on Iran in June 2025 and now the current war - have exposed the limits of China’s role,” he added.

For Leoni from King’s College London, the larger point is that China still does not appear willing to assume the sort of interventionist posture long associated with American power.

“China continues to confirm that its leaders are not willing to take the sort of responsibility or interventionist posture that we have seen the US taking since the end of World War II,” he said.

“China is keen to remain out of many world crises, so this exposes the limits of its power projection and the fact that Chinese elites are generally cautious in foreign policy matters,” Leoni added.

Either way, whether China can sustain this balancing act may depend less on any shift in its policy than on whether future developments force it to choose sides, suggested analysts.

“Overall, China will continue to prioritise flexibility - maintaining working relationships with all sides while avoiding commitments that would constrain its room for manoeuvre,” Burton, the independent political analyst, said.