analysis East Asia
Ahead of Trump-Xi summit, China moves to build leverage and limit risks
The convergence in timing of China’s recent flurry of diplomatic efforts with neighbours, as well as outreach towards Taiwan, has reinforced its broader effort to shape the ground ahead of the Trump-Xi summit, say analysts.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) shakes hands with Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, in Beijing, China, Apr 14, 2026. (Photo: cnsphoto via Reuters)
This audio is generated by an AI tool.
BEIJING: China has stepped up diplomatic engagement across multiple fronts ahead of an anticipated meeting between President Xi Jinping and US counterpart Donald Trump next month, in what analysts say is a calculated bid to strengthen its negotiating hand for the summit.
In about a week, China has hosted senior officials and leaders from Vietnam, the United Arab Emirates and Spain, and dispatched its foreign minister to North Korea.
At the same time, Beijing has stepped up outreach across the Taiwan Strait by welcoming the leader of Taiwan’s main opposition party.
Observers say the burst of activity points to a broader effort to shape the conditions around the summit to ensure China enters the talks from a position of strength rather than on the defensive.
They say Beijing is pursuing three objectives at once - reducing the risk of sudden shocks on its doorstep, reinforcing ties with key regional partners and projecting itself as the steadier power in contrast to a Washington distracted by the conflict in the Middle East.
“Beijing appears to be tidying the strategic landscape before the Trump-Xi meeting, not by removing all tension, but by making sure any tension is on terms it can manage,” Nathan Attrill, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, told CNA.
FLURRY OF DIPLOMACY
China has hosted a string of high-level visitors in recent days.
On Wednesday (Apr 15), Xi met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at the Great Hall of the People in the heart of Beijing, where Xi called the stability of China-Russia ties “precious” and urged closer strategic coordination, while Lavrov praised the resilience of bilateral ties and said Moscow was ready to deepen cooperation.
Xi also met with Vietnam’s President To Lam. Both leaders used the meeting to underscore the importance of stable party-to-party and state ties, while signalling continued efforts to manage differences and deepen economic cooperation.
The previous day, Xi met with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez in separate meetings.
With Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, Xi paired calls for closer bilateral cooperation with a four-point proposal on Middle East peace, in his first public remarks on the conflict since it began in late February.
With Sanchez, Xi emphasised multilateralism and closer China-Spain cooperation amid global turbulence, while Spain also sought to deepen economic ties.
On the cross-strait front, on Apr 10, the Chinese supremo met with Cheng Li-wun, the chairperson of Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and the party’s first leader to visit China in a decade. During their meeting, Xi expressed willingness to work with all political parties in Taiwan to advance ties.
That same day, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang - marking his first visit to the country in seven years. Both sides pledged to strengthen strategic communication and coordination.
Analysts said these engagements were not necessarily part of a single coordinated strategy. But their convergence in timing has reinforced Beijing’s broader effort to shape the environment ahead of the Trump-Xi summit, which Trump said is now set for May 14 to 15 after he delayed the trip because of the Iran war.
“The overall pattern is strategic: shore up vulnerable relationships, signal diplomatic reach and avoid entering the Trump-Xi meeting looking isolated or reactive,” said Attrill from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
At the heart of Beijing’s pre-summit push is a clear priority - stabilising its immediate neighbourhood to prevent disruptions that could undercut its leverage with Washington, analysts told CNA, citing Wang’s visit to North Korea as a key example.
“Any sudden instability on the (Korean) Peninsula would inherently weaken Beijing’s negotiating hand with Washington, stripping China of its leverage as a ‘stabiliser’,” Lee Chan Hui, a Singapore-based China observer and geopolitical analyst, told CNA.
The concern is not abstract: North Korea this month showcased fresh weapons activity, including what state media said were missile tests involving cluster-bomb warheads, as well as cruise and anti-ship missiles launched from a newly unveiled destroyer.
Wang’s recent visit should thus be read as a move to “firmly re-establish Beijing’s regional authority”, Lee added.
Despite longstanding rhetoric of a socialist “brotherhood”, Lee said North Korea’s closer alignment with Russia since 2023 has complicated Beijing’s influence.
Pyongyang’s growing closeness with Moscow appeared to stem in part from Russia’s wartime demand for ammunition and North Korea’s interest in economic aid, energy and possible military support in return.
China is now seeking to rebuild that influence, not to resolve the nuclear issue outright - referring to North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile standoff with the US and its allies - but to ensure it retains a decisive voice on developments on the Peninsula, said Lee.
“Beijing tends to maintain a sufficiently stable relationship with Pyongyang, enough to influence the Kim regime, without assuming responsibility for resolving the nuclear conflict.”
That balancing act could also carry a more forward-looking purpose, noted Lee.
With Trump having publicly signalled openness last October to meeting Kim again, he said Wang’s visit may help Beijing better gauge Pyongyang’s position and concerns, allowing Beijing to avoid being sidelined and to preserve influence ahead of any renewed diplomacy.
He added that the push to steady the Korean Peninsula also reflects a wider concern in Beijing - the risk of multiple fronts heating up at once, particularly as conflict in the Middle East draws in US attention.
Now approaching its seventh week, the conflict has badly disrupted flows through the Strait of Hormuz, a vital route for global oil and gas supplies and an important artery for energy imports into Asia, including China.
“The escalation of the Iran conflict has definitely changed China’s calculus of its surrounding security landscape,” Lee said, noting that a crisis on the Korean Peninsula could trigger a US and allied military buildup in East Asia, complicating China’s security environment.
Against that backdrop, rebuilding influence over Pyongyang becomes not just a bilateral priority, but part of a broader effort to prevent regional spillover and keep tensions from escalating beyond Beijing’s control, Lee said.
SIGNALS, NOT CONCESSIONS
Beyond managing risks and shoring up leverage, Beijing is also calibrating its actions to shape perceptions - particularly in Washington and across the wider region, analysts told CNA.
That is most evident in its approach to Taiwan, where recent outreach has been paired with carefully framed messaging.
Days after Xi met with KMT chair Cheng, Beijing rolled out new cross-strait measures aimed at expanding exchanges and economic links, with several of them explicitly contingent on the shared political basis of adhering to the “1992 Consensus” and opposing “Taiwan independence”.
The “1992 Consensus” refers to a formula under which both sides acknowledge there is “one China”.
Analysts said the moves are designed to send a dual signal.
Beijing is seeking to shape Taiwan’s internal political dynamics while signalling to Washington that tensions across the strait remain manageable, said Lee.
Such efforts are aimed at presenting an alternative narrative to the more confrontational posture of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party, while reinforcing the idea that cross-strait issues can be handled through dialogue rather than deterrence, he added.
For Beijing, a key audience for that messaging is Trump himself, said William Yang, a senior analyst for Northeast Asia at the International Crisis Group, an independent non-governmental organisation focused on conflict prevention and resolution.
“Beijing is using the Xi-Cheng meeting to show that, beyond the Taiwanese government’s focus on defence, other political forces are prioritising dialogue and stability across the strait,” he said.
By drawing a contrast between the KMT’s approach and President Lai Ching-te’s emphasis on self-defence, China is seeking to shape Trump’s thinking ahead of the summit and potentially convince him to scale back or suspend US arms sales to Taiwan, he added.
The messaging extends beyond Taiwan.
In the South China Sea, there are early signs that Beijing is adopting a more calibrated approach toward the Philippines, dialling down coercive actions in favour of diplomacy, said Yang.
Long at odds over overlapping claims in the South China Sea and repeated confrontations around disputed shoals and reefs, China and the Philippines held fresh talks in late March under their bilateral consultation mechanism, with both sides saying they would continue dialogue and better manage differences.
At the same time, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has said he is open to restarting joint oil and gas talks with Beijing in disputed waters, suggesting the Iran war and resulting energy pressures may provide the impetus for a breakthrough.
Such pressures, linked to the war in Iran, have created space for engagement, Yang noted.
“China likely views prioritising diplomacy over coercion … as the more sensible approach ahead of the Trump-Xi summit,” he said, adding that this could shape perceptions in Washington that tensions in the South China Sea are easing.
More broadly, China’s outreach to regional partners - including hosting Vietnam’s top leader - reflects an effort to position itself as a reliable and engaged power in the Indo-Pacific, he said.
At a time when questions over US commitment are growing among some allies, Beijing’s increased engagement with middle powers is aimed at strengthening its regional standing while presenting a contrast with what Yang described as a more “unpredictable disruptor”.
SETTING THE TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT
Beijing is also working to shape the narrative going into the Trump-Xi meeting - projecting itself as a steady, central actor even as global tensions mount, said analysts.
As an example of that broader narrative, Ren Xiao, a professor at Fudan University’s Institute of International Studies, pointed to remarks Wang made on Mar 8 during a press conference on the sidelines of China’s annual Two Sessions, when the foreign minister was discussing consular protection and the safety of Chinese nationals overseas.
“While the world ahead of you is full of turmoil, the country behind you remains as steady as a mountain,” Wang said, in a message directed at Chinese citizens abroad.
Ren said China is seeking to translate its growing strength into influence, while reinforcing a narrative that it stands “on the side of world peace” and serves as a stabilising anchor for global development.
That framing is also tied to China’s material interests, particularly as tensions in the Middle East threaten energy flows.
China’s oil imports from the Persian Gulf account for about 20 per cent of its total - not “overwhelmingly large” but still an important source, Ren noted, adding that efforts to de-escalate conflict serve both China’s own interests and broader global stability.
Beijing is also seeking to signal to Washington that its standing in Asia is rising relative to the US, while reinforcing that its priority lies in maintaining dominance in its immediate neighbourhood rather than competing globally, said Yang from the International Crisis Group.
At the same time, analysts said Beijing is acutely aware that economic pressure - not just security flashpoints - will likely dominate the summit.
“From Beijing’s perspective, technology export controls and tariffs are the most likely levers the US administration will use,” said Lee, the Singapore-based geopolitical analyst.
Anticipating such pressure, China’s recent engagements - from outreach to Pyongyang to cross-strait signalling and diplomacy in the Middle East - are part of a broader effort to maximise its leverage before the Trump-Xi summit, Lee said.
“These manoeuvres are aimed at reducing the US’s bargaining chips at the summit, limiting Trump’s room to employ an aggressive diplomatic posture,” he added.
Yang of the International Crisis Group said China continues to view its dominance in rare earth supply chains as a key advantage, while remaining wary of US export controls that could restrict its access to advanced technologies.
Ensuring the continuation of a fragile trade truce with Washington would give Beijing critical time to strengthen its capabilities in sectors such as artificial intelligence and advanced manufacturing, he added.
WHAT TO WATCH BEFORE THE SUMMIT
As the summit date nears, the key question is whether Beijing can sustain this carefully calibrated approach - or whether external shocks force it onto a less predictable footing, analysts told CNA.
One immediate test lies in the Iran conflict and tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, where China must balance its economic interests with its preference to avoid deeper security entanglement, they said.
More broadly, China is expected to continue demonstrating diplomatic reach across multiple fronts, reinforcing what Attrill of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute described as its strongest position - breadth.
“It can still demonstrate relevance across multiple theatres simultaneously,” he said, pointing to Beijing’s flurry of high-level engagements.
In Southeast Asia, even as economic ties remain strong, maritime frictions - particularly in the South China Sea - continue to limit how far Beijing can convert that into durable strategic trust.
“China’s increased engagement with regional middle powers can help strengthen its regional standing … at a time when scepticism toward US credibility is rising,” said Yang from the International Crisis Group.
Southeast Asia would narrowly align with China over the US if forced to choose sides, according to an annual think tank survey released on Apr 7 - the latest swing in a region where sentiment has oscillated between the two powers in recent years.
Regional wariness of China nevertheless remains substantial, even as it has gone down. Distrust in China dipped to 35.2 per cent this year from 41.2 per cent last year, the survey found, with more than two-fifths of sceptical respondents citing concerns that Beijing’s economic and military power could threaten their countries’ interests and sovereignty.
Still, whether Beijing’s approach works may depend on its ability to keep tensions under control without giving up ground on core interests - and on whether unexpected events, from renewed conflict to fresh moves by Washington or regional actors, end up changing the agenda before the summit, Yang added.
To Fudan University’s Ren, however, broader trends are in China’s favour.
“China does not see itself as having any weak positions,” he said.
“The evolution of the global situation and shifts in the balance of power are increasingly favourable to China.”
